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STATE AND NON-STATE JUSTICE SYSTEMS IN
AFGHANISTAN: THE NEED FOR SYNERGY
ALI WARDAK*
1.

INTRODUCTION

The long Afghan conflict has resulted in an extensive
destruction of Afghanistan‘s state justice institutions that existed
prior to the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (―USSR‖)
invasion of the country in December 1979. The destruction has not
only included extensive damage to buildings, office furniture,
official records, legal resources, and essential office equipment, but
also the death, imprisonment, and migration of hundreds of
professional justice officials, including qualified judges,
prosecutors, police officers, and prison wardens.1 Following the
collapse of the Taliban regime, the Bonn Agreement of December
2001 authorized formation of the Afghanistan Judicial
Commission.2 The Bonn Agreement tasked the Commission—with
help from the United Nations and other international actors—to
―rebuild the [Afghan] domestic justice system in accordance with
Islamic principles, international standards, the rule of law and
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Society of Criminology and Victimology.
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affectionate support while working on this Article. An earlier version
of this Article was presented by the author at ―The Afghanisation
Strategy,‖ a seminar organized by Casa Asia in Barcelona, Spain on June 15, 2009.
1 Ali Wardak, Building a Post-War Justice System in Afghanistan, 41 J. CRIME L.
& SOC. CHANGE 319, 328 (2004).
2 See Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the
Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, S.C. Res. 1383, U.N.
SCOR, 4434th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/2001/1154 (Dec. 5, 2001), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3f48f4754.html
[hereinafter
Bonn
Agreement].
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Afghan legal traditions.‖3 The Commission, however, which lacked
both vision and competence, had difficulty drawing up a roadmap
for rebuilding the post-Taliban justice system and working
collaboratively with permanent Afghan justice institutions.4 This
situation has had important negative implications for the process of
rebuilding a post-Taliban justice system in Afghanistan over the past
ten years.
Afghanistan‘s post-Taliban administrations, supported by,
among others, the United Nations, Italy, the United States,
Germany, and Canada, embarked on the complex task of
rebuilding Afghanistan‘s rule of law and justice institutions. The
various national and international efforts in this process are guided
by several strategies, which mainly include the 2008 Afghanistan
National Development Strategy, the National Justice Sector Strategy,
National Justice Program, and the 2010 Afghanistan National
Development Strategy Prioritization and Implementation Plan.5 While
overlapping, these strategies provide guidance to the Afghan
government‘s rule of law and justice implementation program, as
well a framework for international donor support.6 Key objectives of
the Afghanistan National Development Strategy that were to be
accomplished by the end of 2010 included completion of the basic
legal framework (including civil, criminal, and commercial law),
rehabilitation of the physical infrastructure of justice institutions,
establishment of fully functional justice institutions throughout
Afghanistan, review and reform of oversight of corruption-related
procedures, addressing lack of due process and miscarriages of
justice, and strengthening the professionalism, credibility, and
integrity of the justice system personnel.7
Id. at 4.
See U.N. Secretary-General, The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications
for International Peace and Security: Rep. of the Secretary-General, delivered to the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/1212 (Dec. 30, 2003); see also Wardak, supra
note 1 (discussing the difficulties of working with Afghan institutions to establish
a cohesive justice system).
5 See generally LIANA SUN WYLER & KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R41484, AFGHANISTAN: U.S. RULE OF LAW AND JUSTICE SECTOR ASSISTANCE
(2010) (explaining generally the international reform efforts in Afghanistan).
6 Id. at 17.
7 INT‘L MONETARY FUND, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFG.: AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY: FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 1387 (2008/2009), MAKING A
DIFFERENCE: TRANSITION FROM PLANNING TO PRACTICE 10 (2009), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/cr09319.pdf
[hereinafter
AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY].
3
4
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This Article argues that a post-Taliban justice system, built on a
meaningful synergy between state and non-state justice
institutions, has a very strong potential for providing accessible,
effective, cost-effective and transparent justice to all sections of the
Afghan society. This Article is divided into three main sections.
Section 2 examines the achievements as well as the problems that
have surfaced throughout the process of rebuilding Afghanistan‘s
state justice institutions over the past ten years. Section 3 discusses
non-state justice institutions, focusing on jirga and shura. After
examining positive aspects of jirga and shura, the negative aspects
of these non-state institutions of local dispute settlement are
highlighted. In Section 4, this Article focuses on the ―hybrid model
of Afghan justice,‖ which was proposed by the 2007 Afghanistan
Human Development Report.8 The ―hybrid model‖ recommends the
creation of meaningful institutional links between state and nonstate justice systems in Afghanistan. The Article concludes that a
meaningful synergy between state and non-state justice institutions
has a strong potential to provide justice to all sections of Afghan
society and to become a channel of communication among
ordinary citizens and their state in post-Taliban Afghanistan.
2.

STATE JUSTICE SYSTEM

Although it is difficult to draw a clear dividing line between
state and non-state justice systems in Afghanistan, the former
generally refers to positive law that functions through legal codes
and state institutions, such as the courts, prosecutors, police, the
prison service, and the bar of law. Thus, in the context of
Afghanistan, key state justice and judicial institutions include the
Supreme Court (stara mahkama), the Attorney General‘s Office (loy
saranwali), the police (sarandoi), the Ministry of Justice (wezarate-eadelia), and the prison service. Although these institutions are
supposed to be closely interconnected, in reality there exists little
organic chain-like interaction among them, and therefore, they
hardly operate as a ―system.‖9 Nevertheless, the totality of these
8 CTR. FOR POLICY & HUMAN DEV., AFGHANISTAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
REPORT, BRIDGING MODERNITY AND TRADITION: RULE OF LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR
JUSTICE 4 (2007), available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/nationalreports/
asiathepacific/afghanistan/nhdr2007.pdf [hereinafter AFGHANISTAN HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT REPORT].
9 See Ali Wardak, Rule of Law in Afghanistan: An Overview, in 4 PETERSBERG
PAPERS ON AFGHANISTAN AND THE REGION 47 (Wolfgang Danspeckgruber ed., 2009)
(explaining the development of Afghan political and judicial institutions). See
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justice institutions has historically been referred to as a nezam-eadlee wa qazaiee (justice and judicial order/system), which was
central to the maintenance of social and political order in pre-war
Afghanistan.
While progress in rebuilding the Afghan state justice system
during the past ten years has been slow and patchy, it has
nevertheless been noticeable: significant work has been done on
legislation; several hundred judges, prosecutors, and prison
wardens, and thousands of police personnel have been trained;
some justice institutions have been refurbished; and several new
ones have been built from scratch.10 Progress has also been made
with regard to building administrative capacity within the existing
justice institutions and the publication and distribution of a large
body of law to legal professionals.11 Progress in rebuilding
Afghanistan‘s state justice system has included the establishment
of the Independent Bar Association of Afghanistan, legal aid
departments in Kabul and in three provinces, the Independent
National Legal Training Centre (―INLTC‖) in Kabul, and a
committee for the simplification of judicial bureaucracy.12
Moreover, there has been an agreement between the Attorney
General and Ministry of Interior on the development and
implementation of measures to improve prosecution processes,
and the introduction of common telephone numbers for use by the
public to register complaints.13
However despite the above-mentioned achievements, the postTaliban state justice system is far from delivering justice to the
Afghan people and faces serious problems. The nature and
severity of these problems appear to have heavily overshadowed
what has been achieved thus far. These problems include endemic
corruption, high levels of professional incompetence, inadequacy
of
physical
infrastructure
such
as
courtrooms
and
detention/correctional facilities, very low levels of public trust,
and the provision of minimal international funding for the
generally AFGHANISTAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 8 (discussing
generally the social developments in Afghanistan); CHRIS JOHNSON ET AL.,
AFGHANISTAN‘S POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (2003), available at
http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/4810.pdf (discussing generally the
lack of cohesiveness among Afghan institutions).
10 See generally AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY, supra note 8.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 33.
13 Id. at 33.
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rebuilding of justice and rule of law institutions in post-Taliban
Afghanistan.14 Due to the United States‘ overemphasis on the
―War on Terror‖ in Afghanistan, the issue of rebuilding justice and
rule of law institutions has, until recent years, been largely
neglected. According to Lakhdar Brahimi, ―[t]he international
community, including the United Nations is just starting to pay
enough attention to rule-of-law issues. In Afghanistan, the judicial
reform process was largely neglected, and I must confess that I
personally bear a large part of responsibility for that.‖15 This
observation, particularly the allocation of insufficient funds to
reforming and rebuilding justice and rule of law institutions until
recent years, is illustrated in Figure 1, below.
FIGURE 1: U.S. CIVILIAN FUNDING FOR AFGHAN ROL ASSISTANCE FY
2002 - FY 2010 AND FINANCIAL 2011 REQUEST16

14 See generally STEPHEN CARTER & KATE CLARK, NO SHORTCUT TO STABILITY:
JUSTICE,
POLITICS,
AND
INSURGENCY
IN
AFGHANISTAN
(2010),
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Asia/1210
pr_afghanjustice.pdf (discussing the fundamental role of justice to stability in
Afghanistan); WYLER & KATZMAN, supra note 5, at 5 (describing public perceptions
of corruption in Afghanistan).
15 LAKHDAR BRAHIMI, 7TH GLOBAL FORUM ON REINVENTING GOVERNMENT
BUILDING TRUST IN GOVERNMENT, STATE BUILDING IN CRISIS AND POST-CONFLICT
COUNTRIES 15 (2007), available at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/
public/documents/un/unpan026305.pdf.
16 WYLER & KATZMAN, Supra note 5, at 27.
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Figure 1, above, indicates that assistance from the United States
to Afghan justice and rule of law (―ROL‖) institutions for fiscal
years 2007 and 2008 was only seven million and eight million
dollars respectively; the total of this assistance from fiscal years
2002 through 2007 did not exceed $160 million. It was only from
fiscal year 2008 on that there was a significant increase in assistance
to Afghan justice and rule of law institutions, which peaked in
2010. Some of the problems that Afghanistan‘s justice system
currently faces, particularly the lack of sufficient professional,
human, and legal resources, inadequacy of physical infrastructure,
and low salaries for justice officials, could be directly traced to the
very low level of investment in this sector.
Other than insufficient investment in the justice sector, national
and international efforts have primarily focused on strengthening
the pre-war state justice institutions in Afghanistan—they have
mainly focused on patchy ―legal engineering‖ and quick fixes, and
on meeting targets and the technical aspects of reform at the
expense of its normative dimensions.17 Different donor countries
concentrated on different aspects of the justice sector without
effective coordination among them and with the Afghan state
institutions.18 This situation also seems to have resulted in the
continued absence of a coherent vision for rebuilding and
reforming the justice sector in Afghanistan. The outcome has been
a fragmented justice ―system,‖ the key components of which (the
judiciary, police, prosecution, and prison service) do not operate as
a system at all.19 All these problems, combined with a growing
insurgency and persistent institutionalized corruption, have

17 See generally Wardak, supra note 9, at 47 (explaining the development of
Afghan political and judicial institutions); Astri Suhrke & Kaja Borchgrevink,
Negotiating Justice Sector Reform in Afghanistan, 51 J. CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 211
(2008) (discussing the post-2001 justice sector reforms in Afghanistan); CARTER &
CLARK, supra note 14 (suggesting that aiming for rigid short-term solutions to
problems plaguing Afghanistan‘s justice system will undermine its long-term
stability).
18 See generally AFGHANISTAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 8;
Wardak, supra note 9 (detailing a lack of communication between Afghanistan
and its international partners in redeveloping Afghanistan‘s justice system).
19 See Wardak, supra note 9 (discussing the absence of a broader institutional
framework to coordinate different parts of Afghanistan‘s developing justice
system); see also JOHNSON ET AL., Supra note 9 (discussing generally the lack of
cohesiveness among Afghan institutions). See generally AFGHANISTAN HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 8.
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further complicated the task of rebuilding an effective justice
system in post-Taliban Afghanistan.
The most serious among the problems which Afghanistan‘s
justice (and many other state) institutions face is corruption.
Although corruption in the Afghan justice system is not a new
phenomenon,20 recent studies reveal a much gloomier picture. A
2010 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (―UNODC‖)
survey reveals that in 2009, Afghans paid around $ 2.5 billion U.S.
dollars in bribes—a figure equivalent to twenty-three percent of
the Afghanistan‘s gross domestic product (―GDP‖).21 The survey,
which is based on real experiences of Afghan men and women (in
both urban and rural areas), reveals that judicial and criminal
justice officials topped those public officials who took bribes
during 2009.22 This picture is illustrated in Figure 2, below.
FIGURE 2: PERCENTAGES OF ADULT POPULATION WHO PAID BRIBES
AFTER CONTACT WITH SELECTED TYPES OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS, BY
TYPE OF OFFICIAL AND URBAN/RURAL AREAS23

20 AFGHANISTAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 8, at 60–64; see also
Wardak, supra note 1 (discussing the history and development of corruption in the
Afghan justice system).
21 UNITED
NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, CORRUPTION IN
AFGHANISTAN: BRIBERY AS REPORTED BY THE VICTIMS 25 (2010), available at
http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Afghanistan/
Afghanistan-corruption-survey2010-Eng.pdf.
22 Id.
23 Id.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

WARDAK_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

1312

10/20/2011 3:13 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 32:5

Figure 2, above, reveals that urban area police officers,
custom officers, judges, and municipal officials ranked highest
(respectively) in the receipt of bribes. And in rural areas,
prosecutors, judges, custom officers, and police officers ranked
highest (respectively) in the receipt of bribes. What is important to
notice is that, in both urban and rural areas, it is mainly judicial
and criminal justice officials who are seen as the most corrupt
public officials, and it is these same officials who are entrusted
with upholding the law. The 2010 Integrity Watch Afghanistan
(―IWA‖) survey reached a very similar conclusion.
The survey indicates that Afghans perceive the main
institutions responsible for security and justice as the most
corrupt. 42% of the respondents consider the Ministry of
Interior to be the most corrupt, while the Ministry of Justice
and the Directorate of National Security are perceived as
the most corrupt by 32% and 30 %, respectively. Moreover,
households paid the highest numbers of bribes for the
provision of security and justice by the police and the
courts.24
In response to endemic and widespread official corruption, the
Afghan government—with the support of the international
community—has devised various anti-corruption strategies and
bodies during the past six years. The most important of these is
the creation of the High Office for Oversight for the
Implementation of the Anti-Corruption Strategy in July 2008.25 The
new body, which is referred to as the High Office for Oversight
(―HOO‖), has devised an ambitious agenda for its activities. To
date, HOO and some key relevant ministries and state institutions
have taken important practical steps in the right direction,
including the simplification of bureaucratic systems in some
government institutions, and the creation of a specialized anticorruption criminal unit. While HOO and its initiatives appear
promising, the January 2011 Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction (―SIGAR‖) Report to the U.S. Congress
24 INTEGRITY WATCH AFG., AFGHAN PERCEPTIONS AND EXPERIENCES OF
CORRUPTION: A NATIONAL SURVEY 11 (2010), available at http://www.iwaweb.org/
Reports/PDF/IWA%20corruption% 20survey%202010.pdf.
25 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR AFG. RECONSTR. (SIGAR), TENTH QUARTERLY
REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 108 (2011) [hereinafter SIGAR REPORT].
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says that, ―[i]n an audit report released in December 2009, SIGAR
found that the HOO suffered from a limited operational capacity.
The audit also found that the organization lacked the
independence required to meet international standards for an
oversight institution . . . .‖26 Indeed as a young institution
operating in very difficult circumstances, HOO has a long way to
go. In order to become an effective and independent institution,
HOO will need strong financial and professional support from
both national and international agencies in the years to come.
Afghan anti-corruption initiatives do not seem to have had
a noticeable impact on reducing corruption in the country, or on
changing its perception among Afghan population. The 2010
Transparency International‘s Corruption Perception Index ranks
Afghanistan, jointly with Myanmar, 176th out of 178 countries—
making it the second most corrupt country in the world.27 All of
this would seem to indicate that the Afghan government has failed
to implement its anti-corruption strategies and initiatives. One of
the main reasons for this failure is that the Afghan government has
been very reluctant to take decisive actions against high ranking
officials suspected or accused of corruption.
Corruption
investigations against high-ranking government officials have been
repeatedly blocked, and honest anti-corruption officials have been
demoted or fired. According to a New York Times report, on
August 28, 2010 Fazel Ahmed Faqiryar—the former deputy
attorney general of Afghanistan—was sacked after he repeatedly
refused to block corruption investigations against high-ranking
government officials.28 The article adds:
[t]he dispute began last year, Mr. Faqiryar said, when he
went before the Afghan Parliament and read aloud the
names of at least 25 Afghan officials who were under
investigation for corruption. The list included some of the
most senior officials in Mr. Karzai‘s government, including
Mohammed Siddiq Chakari, the former minister for hajj

Id. at 109.
TRANSPARENCY INT‘L, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION
PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2 (2010).
28 Dexter Filkins & Alissa Rubin, Graft-Fighting Prosecutor Fired in Afghanistan,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/29/world/
asia/29afghan.html.
26
27
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and Islamic affairs, and Rangin Spanta, who is now the
national security adviser.29
Similarly, high-ranking officials within the justice and rule of law
institutions are hardly ever investigated and/or sanctioned for
corruption, although several dozen judges and other judicial
officials have been punished for corruption recently.30 However,
there is no evidence indicating that those who are punished
include high-ranking judicial officials.31 This situation goes
directly against a key principle of the idea of rule of law—
accountability of all citizens before the law, and the equal
enforcement of laws. The immunity of those with political power
and money from accountability is likely to result in the persistence
of corruption. This indeed seems to be the case in Afghanistan
today.
As will be examined in the next section, persistent
corruption within the state justice institutions has not only
weakened trust in them, but has also driven many Afghans to take
their disputes to the Taliban for resolution, where the Taliban
courts are ―the only effective and trusted tribunals of justice. Above
all, unlike the state courts, ‗their decisions are not dependent on the
ability to pay bribes and will be enforced.‖32 However, the Taliban‘s
courts operate only in the areas that they control, or where they
enjoy significant support. In many other parts of the country, most
Afghans continue to take their disputes to non-state local justice
institutions for resolution.33
3.

NON-STATE JUSTICE SYSTEM

As mentioned in the previous discussion, the
overwhelming majority of disputes in Afghanistan are resolved
outside of the state justice system. They are resolved by
community or village-based local institutions and processes, which
operate even less as a ―system‖ than the state justice ―system.‖
Although these local institutions and processes may interact with
state justice institutions in different contexts and to varying
Id.
CARTER & CLARK, supra note 14, at 32.
31 Id. at 33.
32 Frank Ledwidge, Justice and Counter Insurgency in Afghanistan: A Missing
Link, 154 ROYAL U NITED S ERVICES INST . J. 6, 7 (2009).
33 Id. at 8.
29
30
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degrees, the interaction occurs outside of a regulated framework.34
The most important non-state institutions in Afghanistan are jirga
and shura. The particular form and composition of a jirga or shura
are determined by the nature of a dispute at hand, but typically by
a body of respected marakachian or rishsafidan (local elders and
leaders) who refer to customary laws in order to reach a settlement
that is acceptable to disputants and to the community. Jirga and
shura address issues ranging from minor bodily harm and
agricultural land boundaries to serious and sometimes violent
conflicts concerning communal lands and murder.
Jirgas and shuras place strong emphasis on reconciliation
and making peace among disputants. Thus, unlike the state justice
system, which creates losers and winners, jirgas and shuras reach
community-led decisions that promote restorative justice (as
opposed to retributive justice), and help to restore peace and
dignity among the victims, offenders, and the community.35 These
local Afghan institutions also aim to reintegrate offenders back into
the community after holding them accountable for a wrongdoing.36
As a form of alternative dispute resolution, these practices can also
reduce strain on a capacity-deficient state justice system.37 In
addition, jirgas and shuras are shown to be more accessible, more
efficient (in terms of time and money), perceived as less corrupt,
and more trusted by Afghans compared to formal state courts.38 A
more recent national survey by the Asia Foundation strongly
confirms these findings.39 Figure 3, below, compares respondents‘
perceptions of state courts and local shura and jirga with regard to
five key issues.
34 NOAH COBURN & JOHN DEMPSEY, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, INFORMAL DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IN AFGHANISTAN 3–4 (2010), available at http://www.usip.org/files/
resources/sr247_0.pdf. See generally AFG. RES. AND EVALUATION UNIT (AREU),
COMMUNITY-BASED DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESSES IN NANGARHAR PROVINCE
(2009), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b3870cf2.html
[hereinafter COMMUNITY-BASED DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESSES] (discussing
community-based dispute resolution in Afghanistan).
35 COBURN & DEMPSEY, supra note 34, at 3; see also AFGHANISTAN HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 8, at 10.
36 COBURN & DEMPSEY, supra note 34, at 3.
37 Id. at 2–3.
38 Id. at 2; see, e.g., ASIA FOUND., AFGHANISTAN IN 2010: A SURVEY OF THE
AFGHAN PEOPLE 134 (2010), available at http://asiafoundation.org/resources/
pdfs/Afghanistanin2010survey.pdf [hereinafter ASIA FOUNDATION]; see also Wardak,
supra note 1.
39 ASIA FOUNDATION, supra note 38, at 134.
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FIGURE 3: PERCEPTIONS OF THE STATE AND NON-STATE JUSTICE
SYSTEMS: PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS WHO AGREE (STRONGLY
AGREE AND SOMEWHAT AGREE) WITH FIVE STATEMENTS RELATED TO
STATE COURTS AND JIRGA AND SHURA40

Strongly Agree and
Somewhat Agree
Are accessible to me
Are fair and trusted
Follow the local norms and values
of our people
Are effective at delivering justice
Resolve cases timely and promptly

State Courts
(%)
73
53
51
54
42

Jirgas and
Shuras (%)
86
73
70
69
66

Figure 3, above, illustrates that jirga and shura are
perceived by respondents to be performing better than State
justice institutions. These non-state institutions are shown to be
more accessible, more trusted, in accord with accepted local
norms, more effective, less corrupt, and more prompt in the
resolution of disputes than state courts. These results would seem
to indicate that most Afghans continue to perceive non-state justice
institutions more positively than state courts. However, male
elders (rishsafidan/marakachian) usually dominate gatherings of
jirgas and shuras, and women are largely excluded from
participation in the decision-making of these bodies as Figure 4,
below illustrates.

40

Id.
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FIGURE 4: REPRESENTATION AT LOCAL JIRGAS AND SHURAS41
How frequently are people from various community groups present at a village- or
neighbourhood-based Jirga or Shura?
(Values given in percentages based on a sample size of 2339 individuals)
Always
Sometimes
Rarely
Never
Don‘t Know
Refused
Ordinary
elders
65
25
7
3
1
*
(Rishsafidan)
Mullahs
36
43
15
6
1
*
Local leaders
(Khan or
31
36
22
9
2
*
Malik)
Commanders
12
25
34
26
3
1
Women
2
6
21
67
3
1
Other
2
3
5
9
81
1
As Figure 4, above, illustrates, two-thirds of respondents
said that ordinary elders (rishsafidan) were always represented on
the jirga or shura, and another quarter said that they were
sometimes represented. One-third of the individuals surveyed
said that mullahs were always represented, and more than a third
said that they were sometimes represented. There was a similar
response regarding local leaders (Khan or Malik). Commanders
were much less likely to be represented on local jirgas or shuras.
More importantly, these data indicate that women had the least
representation in jirgas and shuras: only eight percent of the
respondents said that women were always or sometimes
represented in jirgas or shuras. This confirms—as in most other
spheres of life in Afghan society—that women are largely excluded
from the structure and processes of jirgas and suhras. This situation
not only has serious implications for gender equality within these

41 For a partial representation of this data, see AFGHANISTAN HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 8, at 98–99 (2007). The Centre for Policy and
Human Development survey was commissioned by the UNDP-supported Centre
for Policy and Human Development (―CPHD‖), at Kabul University, and was
carried out by ACSOR in February 2007. The survey‘s sample consisted of 2339
men and women, which covered thirty-two out of Afghanistan‘s thirty-four
provinces. The full dataset from this survey is on file with the second author, to
whom any questions can be directed.
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local institutions of dispute settlement, but for the actual delivery
of justice to women at a local level.
Another serious problem is that some settlements made by
jirgas and shuras may include baad—the practice of offering a
woman into marriage as a means of dispute settlement. This
practice violates Afghan state laws, shari’a, and fundamental
human rights.42 Although recent field studies reveal that the
practice of baad is increasingly rare, even among Pashtuns in
eastern Afghanistan,43 its mere occurrence has serious implications
for the human rights of women in Afghan society, and for their
fundamental freedoms. However, it is important to recognize that
baad and the exclusion of women from participation in jirgas and
shuras are not inherent characteristics of these non-state justice
institutions; they are the characteristics of Afghan patriarchal
society. According to a recent field study:
[w]omen‘s access to these [community-based dispute
resolution] processes and participation in them is
constrained and at times decisions are made which do not
uphold women‘s human rights. However, this is not an
outcome of community-based dispute resolution or
customary law itself, but is instead a consequence of
prevailing gender roles and relations in Afghanistan more
widely.44
Indeed, women‘s rights are widely violated in Afghan society, and
the state justice system does not fare better than non-state justice
institutions.45 Furthermore, it is important to point out that
42 See generally AFGHANISTAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 8
(exploring the importance of rule of law to human development); Ali Wardak,
Jirga: Power and Traditional Conflict Resolution in Afghanistan, in LAW AFTER GROUND
ZERO 187–204 (John Strawson ed. 2002) (exploring the institution of jirga as a
traditional mechanism of conflict resolution in Afghanistan); Ali Wardak,
Structures of Authority and Local Dispute Settlement in Afghanistan, in CONFLICTS AND
CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN MIDDLE EASTERN SOCIETIES: BETWEEN TRADITION AND
MODERNITY 347–70 (Hans-Jörg Albrecht et al. eds., 2006) (discussing structures of
authority and local dispute settlement in Afghanistan); Wardak, supra note 1
(examining sharia, jurga, the Afghan interim legal framework, and human rights
principles).
43 U.S. AGENCY FOR INT‘L DEV., AFGHANISTAN RULE OF LAW STABILIZATION
PROGRAM ASSESSMENT (INFORMAL COMPONENT) 21 (2011); see also COMMUNITYBASED DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESSES, supra note 34.
44 COMMUNITY-BASED DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESSES, supra note 34, at 4.
45 CTR. FOR INT‘L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION, 4 THE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM
MONITOR:
AFGHANISTAN
6–7
(2010),
available
at
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women‘s access to the state justice system, where approximately
three percent of the judges,46 and less than once percent of police
personnel are women, 47 is severely limited. Another problem
with non-state justice institutions according to some studies is that
in some parts of Afghanistan jirgas and shuras are influenced by
local strong men and warlords, and, therefore, may produce
biased and unfair outcomes.48 However, other studies indicate
that because many local strong men and warlords have been
appointed to key government positions in recent years, their
influence over jirgas and shuras has significantly been reduced in
rural areas.49 Nevertheless, like the state justice institutions, jirgas
and shuras also have serious problems in resolving local disputes
transparently.
These problems need to be addressed in
imaginative and prudent ways.
4. THE NEED FOR SYNERGY
What has been examined in the previous two sections of this
paper indicates that both state and non-state justice ―systems‖ in
Afghanistan have serious problems in delivering justice to the
Afghan people. This examination indicates that Afghanistan needs
a new coherent ―Afghan‖ vision for re-building a post-Taliban
justice system—a vision that is deeply rooted in Afghan culture
and society, and is capable of meeting the new complex needs of
the Afghan population effectively, cost-effectively, and in humane
ways. The new vision should be capable of envisaging a
sustainable justice system that bridges Afghan cultural and
religious values into modern ideas about justice and its delivery in
post-Taliban Afghanistan. Such a vision—in terms of a meaningful
synergy between state and non-state justice—is proposed by the
2007 UNDP-supported Afghanistan Human Development
Report.50 This vision is formulated in the form of a ―hybrid model
for Afghan justice,‖ which is illustrated in Figure 5, below.
http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/CIGI-SSR-AfghanistanSeptember2010.pdf.
46 AFGHANISTAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 8, at 71.
47 Id. at 83.
48 FEINSTEIN INT‘L FAMINE CTR., TUFTS UNIV., HUMAN SECURITY AND LIVELIHOOD
OF
RURAL
AFGHANS
(2002–2003)
7
(2004),
available
at
http://www.cmi.no/pdf/?file=/afghanistan/doc/Mazurana2.pdf.
49 AFGHANISTAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 8, at 97–98.
50 See generally AFGHANISTAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 8, at 71
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FIGURE 5: HYBRID MODEL FOR AFGHAN JUSTICE51

The ―hybrid model‖ proposes the creation of Alternative
Dispute Resolution (―ADR‖) and Human Rights Units alongside
the state justice system at the district level. The model envisages
that the ADR Unit would be responsible for selecting appropriate
mechanisms to settle disputes outside the courtroom. This would
mainly include jirga and shura, but also other appropriate civil
society organizations such as Community Development Councils
(―CDCs‖) that have been established by the Afghan government‘s
National Solidarity Programme in recent years. ADR mechanisms
would handle minor criminal offenses52 and civil cases, while

(proposing a hybrid model of formal and informal justice).
51 Id. at 129.
52 The existing Penal Code of Afghanistan categorizes Ta’zeer offences
(acts/omissions that are prohibited in Islam, but for which specific punishments
are not prescribed under hadd or qisas and diyah) into: jenaiat (felonies), jonha
(misdemeanors) and qabahat (obscenity). It is the first category of offenses—
punished by death or long imprisonments—that are considered as serious crimes.
Most of the other categories are considered less serious offenses.
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giving people a choice to have their cases heard at the nearest state
court. All serious criminal cases, on the other hand, would fall
exclusively within the jurisdiction of the state justice system.
According to the ―hybrid model,‖ the proposed Human
Rights Unit would be staffed by officials from the Afghanistan
Independent Human Rights Commission (―AIHRC‖),53 or from
other Human Rights and Civil Society bodies in Afghanistan. In
order to counterbalance the dominance of men in jirga and shura
within the ADR Unit, the Human Rights Unit would be staffed by
female personnel to the extent feasible. The Human Rights Unit
would be mandated to monitor decisions made by ADR bodies in
order to ensure their consistency with human rights principles.
The Human Rights Unit would also carry out educational and
training activities, and would examine domestic violence, past
human rights abuses, and war crimes.
In addition to the approval of ADR decisions by the
proposed Human Rights Unit, ADR decisions would also need to
be approved by the district state court, or by a concerned mahkamae-shahri (urban court) in Afghan cities. This is to ensure that ADR
decisions do not violate Afghan legal norms and/or the
fundamental principles of Islamic Shari’a. The model proposes that
when ADR decisions fail to be approved by either the Human
Rights Unit or the concerned state court, they would need to be
revised or referred to the state justice system for processing and
adjudication. Also, when ADR decisions are not satisfactory to one
or both disputants, they can be taken back to the formal state
justice system for processing and adjudication. It is important to
mention that the ―hybrid model‖ does not specify the actual
―mechanics‖ of the interactions between the ADR Unit, Human
Rights Unit, and the state court, as these are to be decided in
accordance with the nature and the circumstances of a specific
dispute. This interaction may be conducted through formal
correspondence, through the participation of representatives from
the Human Rights Unit and the state court in the final decision
making session of the ADR Unit, or through other innovative
ways.

53 Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (―AIHRC‖) has
regional offices throughout the country.
Through its ―Monitoring and
Investigation Unit,‖ the Commission receives and investigates human rights
violation complaints from the people of Afghanistan.
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The ―hybrid model,‖ which reflects deeply-held Afghan
moral and cultural values as well as most recent thoughts about
contemporary criminology and criminal justice (restorative justice),
provides a coherent framework for the delivery of effective, cost
effective, accessible, and speedy justice to the Afghan people. As
an innovative formula synergising state and non-state justice
institutions, the model envisages an Afghan justice system that is
less bureaucratic, and therefore, less corruptible. Moreover, since
it is deeply rooted in Afghan culture and society, the ―hybrid
model‖ promises the establishment of a sustainable justice system
that is central to the ―Afghanisation‖ of rebuilding Afghan state
institutions. Despite an angry and threatening response from
Afghan judicial and state justice institutions, and the opposition of
some Afghan women and human rights organizations to the
hybrid model, it has created an important debate among Afghan
and international circles concerned with justice-related issues in
Afghanistan. However, opposition from some influential Afghan
circles had resulted in a slowing down of government policy
responses to the recommendations of the 2007 Afghanistan Human
Development Report and to its proposed ―hybrid model of Afghan
justice.‖
Although the Afghan government signalled its willingness
to engage with traditional justice in the Afghanistan
National Development Strategy of 2008, and again at the
London Conference in early 2010, pressure from the human
rights community and some members of Afghanistan‘s
legal establishment has slowed efforts to codify a clearly
defined relationship between formal and traditional systems
into Afghan law.54
The unhelpful response of Afghanistan‘s legal establishment in
terms of its perceived vested interests in the existing justice system
may be understandable. Opposition from some Afghan women
and human rights organisations—including the AIHRC—to the
―hybrid model‖ is not fully comprehensible. One of the key aims
of the ―hybrid model‖ is the reform of jirga and shura. As
mentioned earlier, a key proposal of the model is that the decision
made by jirga and shura would only have formally binding effects,

54

CTR. FOR INT‘L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION, supra note 45, at 11.
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when they are in line with human right principles, Islamic shari’a
and Afghan laws.
Nevertheless, in recognition of the importance of
synergizing state and non-state justice systems, the Afghan
Ministry of Justice—with the help of the United States Institute of
Peace (―USIP‖)—drafted a National Policy on Relations Between the
Formal Justice System and Dispute Resolution Councils. The draft
Policy, which was subjected to weekly discussions by a complex
―working group‖ for a very long time, is now drafted as The Law on
Dispute Resolution, Shuras and Jigras, by the Ministry of Justice.55
However, the draft law, in its current form, severely limits the
scope of non-state justice institutions and overregulates them.
Moreover, it imposes unrealistic restrictions on jirga/shura
membership and criminalizes non-compliance with provisions of
this law. All these have huge negative implications for the
flexibility, accessibility, local ownership and the ―restorative‖
characteristics of non-state justice institutions. The draft law needs
to be debated openly and objectively; it needs to be discussed in
the framework of the original logic of the ―hybrid model,‖ and in
the light of the results of recent empirical research. It is important
to mention that the ideas derived from the ―hybrid model‖ have
been piloted in some parts of Afghanistan. Preliminary results of
the pilot studies in selected districts in Afghanistan indicate that
the ―hybrid model‖ (or the ideas derived from it) provides
workable solutions to most of the problems that Afghan state and
non-state justice systems currently face.56
5.

CONCLUSION

This Article focused on a brief examination of national and
international efforts to rebuild the justice system in post-Taliban
Afghanistan. As indicated in the Article, progress in the process of
55 See Abdul Qadir Siddique, Informal Justice System to Have Legal Cover,
PAJHWOK AFGAN NEWS, Oct. 25, 2010, http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2010
/10/25/informal-justice-system-have-legal-cover.
56 See generally Ali Wardak, A Field Assessment: Linking Formal and
Informal Customary Justice Mechanisms in Ahmad Aba (Paktia) and Zone 5 of
Jalalabad: An Exploratory Project (2010) (unpublished report) (on file with author)
(commenting on a study which demonstrated the strengths and weaknesses of a
collaboration between the informal and formal sectors in Afghanistan); U.S.
AGENCY FOR INT‘L DEV., supra note 43 (documenting the success of a study which
sought to increase stability in targeted areas of Afghanistan through
strengthening the ability of Community-Based Dispute Resolution mechanisms).
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rebuilding Afghan judicial institutions has been slow, patchy and
problematic. The lack of effective coordination among national
justice institutions, and between national and international actors,
lack of a coherent ―Afghan‖ vision, and the focus on reviving the
old (pre-civil war) justice system with some patchy ―legal
engineering‖ seem to be the main contributing factors.
Furthermore, endemic corruption, high levels of professional
incompetence, inadequacy of detention/correctional facilities, and,
more importantly, a very low level of public trust in the state
justice system continue to pose serious problems in the rebuilding
of judicial institutions in Afghanistan. Thus, the overwhelming
majority of the Afghan population continues to take their disputes
to non-state justice institutions—jirga and shura—for resolution.
Drawing on the 2007 Afghanistan Human Development Report and on
its proposed ―hybrid model,‖ it is maintained that creating a
meaningful synergy between state and non-state justice and civil
society institutions within a coherent framework could provide
effective, cost-effective, accessible and restorative justice to the
Afghan population. Empirical evidence based on recent pilot
studies has confirmed this. This could, in turn, strengthen the
Afghan population‘s trust in its justice system and in the current
national and international efforts to stabilize Afghanistan.
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